Brigham Young University Law School

BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Court of Appeals Briefs

2003

Blain v. Blain : Brief of Appellant
Utah Court of Appeals

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief Submitted to the Utah Court of Appeals; digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law
Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, Brigham Young University, Provo, Utah; machine-generated
OCR, may contain errors.
Randy S. Ludlow; attorney for appellant.
Richard S. Nemelka; Stephen R. Nemelka; attorneys for appellee.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Blain v. Blain, No. 20030864 (Utah Court of Appeals, 2003).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/byu_ca2/4594

This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Court of
Appeals Briefs by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. Policies regarding these Utah briefs are available at
http://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/utah_court_briefs/policies.html. Please contact the Repository Manager at hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu with
questions or feedback.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JULIE D. BLAIN (HORROCKS)
Petitioner/Appellee,
Civil No. 20030864

vs.
DENNIS BLAIN
Respondent/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

AN APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM BOHLING, PRESIDING

RaiMy S.Ludlow #2011
185 South State Street, Suite 208
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-1300
Attprney for Respondent/Appellant

Richard Nemelka
NEMELKA & NEMELKA
6806 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
Telephone: (801) 568-9191
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee

F«L£0
UTAH APPELLATE COURTS
MAY 0 6 200*

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JULIE D. BLAIN (HORROCKS)
Petitioner/Appellee,
Civil No. 20030864

vs.
DENNIS BLAIN
Respondent/Appellant.

BRIEF OF APPELLANT

AN APPEAL FROM THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
THE HONORABLE WILLIAM BOHLING, PRESIDING

Randy S.Ludlow #2011
185 South State Street, Suite 208
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 531-1300
Attorney for Respondent/Appellant

Richard Nemelka
NEMELKA & NEMELKA
6806 South 1300 East
Salt Lake City, UT 84121
Telephone: (801) 568-9191
Attorney for Petitioner/Appellee

TABLE OF CONTENTS

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES

iv

JURISDICTION OF APPELLATE COURT

1

STANDARD OF REVIEW

1

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL

1

CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS

2

STATUTORY PROVISIONS

2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

3

A. NATURE OF CASE

3

B. STATEMENT OF FACTS

4

C. DISPOSITION AT TRIAL

4

RELEVANT FACTS

4

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

8

ARGUMENT

9

POINT I

POINT II

The trial court erred in allowing the testimony of Appellee
and thereafter failing to modify the child support obligation
of Appellant based on that testimony

9

Appellant should be allowed to claim the minor child for all tax
purposes
14

POINT III Appellant should be awarded his attorney's fees
CONCLUSION

15
16

n

CERTIFICATE OF MAILING

17

ADDENDUM

18

EXHIBIT A
EXHIBIT B
EXHIBIT C

Amended Order on Stipulation
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law
Order from trial held February 21, 2003

in

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
CASES

PAGE

Ball v. Peterson, 912 P2d 1006 (UtCt. App. 1996)
1,12
Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006, 1010 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996)
14
Brinkerhoffv. Brinkerhoff, 945 P2dl 13 (Utah Ct. App. 1997)
1
Creekview Apts. Ex rel. Hedman Invs., Inc. v. State Farm Ins. Co., 771 P.2d 693 (Ut. Ct.
App. 1989)
11
General Ins. Co. OfAm. v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502 (Ut. 1976)
11
Hill v. Hill, 841 P.2d 722 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992)
1
Hintzev. Seaich, 20 Utah 2d 275,437 P.2d202 (1968)
11
Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909 (Ut. Ct. App. 1988)
14
Johansen v. Johansen, 202 Ut. App. 75,45 P3d 520 (Ut. Ct. App. 2002)
9,14
Mangerv. Davis, 619P.2d687 (Ut. 1980)
11
Pratt v. Board ofEduc, 564 P.2d 294 (Ut. 1977)
11
Rudman v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991)
2
State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738 (Ut. 1997)
1

STATUTES
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-2a-3(2)(h)
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-45-7.10
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-45-7.21

1
2,13,16
3,15

RULES
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 8(c)

1,3,11

iv

I. APPELLATE JURISDICTION
Jurisdiction is proper in this Court pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(h) and
pursuant to Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 3.
II. STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A.

Should the child support have been modified pursuant to each child reaching

the age of majority.
1.

Standard of Review

Question of law which the court reviews for correctness with out deference to the
District Court. Brinkerhoff v. Brinkerhoff 945 P2dll3 (Utah Ct. App. 1997). Ball v.
Peterson, 912 P2d 1006 (Ut Ct. App. 1996).
B.

Did the trial court act correctly allowing evidence of an alleged agreement

when there were no pleadings filed by the petitioner alleging any affirmative defenses as
required pursuant to Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure.
1.

Standard of Review

Correction of error standard. Question of law which the court reviews without
deference to the District Court. State v. Leyva, 951 P.2d 738 (Ut. 1997).
C.

Should the court have awarded the respondent the child for all tax purposes.
1.

Standard of Review

Abuse of discretion. Hill v. Hill 841 P.2d 722 (Ut. Ct. App. 1992). Failure
to make findings, is itself an abuse of discretion. Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752 P.2d 909 (Ut. Ct.
App. 1988).
1

D.

Should respondent be awarded attorney's fees.
1.

Standard of Review

Abuse of discretion. The trial did not award attorney's fees and attorney's fees
are in the broad discretion of the court, and will not be disturbed absent an abuse of
discretion. Rudrnan v. Rudman, 812 P.2d 73 (Ut. Ct. App. 1991).
III. CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS
There are no constitutional provisions at issue in this case.
IV. STATUTORY PROVISIONS
Utah Code Annotated Section 78-45-7.10 provided as follows:
(1) When a child becomes 18 years of age, or has graduated from high school during the
child's normal and expected year of graduation, whichever occurs later, the base child
support award is automatically adjusted to reflect the base combined child support obligation
shown in the table for the remaining number of children due child support, unless otherwise
provided in the child support order.
(2) The award may not be reduced by a per child amount derived from the base child support
award originally ordered.
(3) Income used for purposes of adjusting the support shall be the income of the parties at
the time of the entry of the original order. If income was not listed in the findings or order
and worksheets were not submitted, the parties may submit tax returns or other verification
of the income.
(Note): the statute was amended after the trial as it relates to paragraph 3 which now reads
as follows:
(3) If the incomes of the parties are not specified in the last order or the worksheets, the
information regarding the incomes is not consistent, or the order deviates from the guidelines,
automatic adjustment of the order does not apply and the order will continue until modified
by the issuing tribunal. If the order is deviated and the parties subsequently obtain a judicial
order that adjusts the support back to the date of the emancipation of the child, the Office of
Recovery Services may not be required to repay any difference in the support collected
during the interim.
2

Utah Code Annotated Section 78-45-7.21 states as follows:
(1) No presumption exists as to which parent should be awarded the right to claim a child or
children as exemptions for federal and state income tax purposes. Unless the parties
otherwise stipulate in writing, the court or administrative agency shall award in any final
order the exemption on a case-by-case basis.
(2) In awarding the exemption, the court or administrative agency shall consider:
(a) as the primary factor, the relative contribution of each parent to the cost of raising the
child; and
(b) among other factors, the relative tax benefit to each parent.
(3) Notwithstanding Subsection (2), the court or administrative agency may not award any
exemption to the noncustodial parent if that parent is not current in his child support
obligation, in which case the court or administrative agency may award an exemption to the
custodial parent.
(4) An exemption may not be awarded to a parent unless the award will result in a tax benefit
to that parent.
V. RULES PROVISION
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure 8(c) provides as follows:
(c) Affirmative defenses. In pleading to a preceding pleading, a party shall set forth
affirmatively accord and satisfaction, arbitration and award, assumption of risk, contributory
negligence, discharge in bankruptcy, duress, estoppel, failure of consideration, fraud,
illegality, injury by fellow servant, laches, license, payment, release, res judicata, statute of
frauds, statute of limitations, waiver, and any other matter constituting an avoidance or
affirmative defense. When a party has mistakenly designated a defense as a counterclaim or
a counterclaim as a defense, the court on terms, ifjustice so requires, shall treat the pleadings
as if there had been a proper designation.

VI. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is an appeal from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Order from
the trial held February 21, 2003 in regards to the Petition for Modification as requested by
Mr. Blain to modify the child support, and to award Mr. Blain the parties remaining minor
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child for tax purposes which was heard before William H. Bohling, Judge of the Third
Judicial District Court, Salt Lake County, State of Utah.
B.

COURSE OF PROCEEDINGS

Mr. Blain had originally requested modification of the child support through
administrative procedures through the Office of Recovery Sendees. The Office of Recovery
Services refused to modify the decree upon emancipation of the minor children. Mr. Blain
thereafter filed a petition to modify in order to change the child support amounts. A
temporary order was granted modifying the support to coincide with his prior obligation for
only one minor child, yet the Office of Recovery Services continued to collect the original
amount. At trial, on February 21, 2003, the trial court ruled that the support obligation
continued at the original amount, and refused to modify the child support based upon
emancipation of any of the parties minor children.
C.

DISPOSITION AT TRIAL COURT

The trial court refused to modify the support obligation based upon the emancipation
of any of the parties minor children, the court made no findings on the tax exemption request,
and the court required each party pay their own attorney's fees.
RELEVANT FACTS
The parties were divorced pursuant to a Decree of Divorce entered on March 20,1997
wherein the parties bifurcated the case (Rl 72-173). The child support had been determined
at a previous Order to Show Cause hearing with Mr. Blain's monthly income being
determined to be $3,310 and Ms. Horrocks monthly income to be $2,341.16 (R41). The child
4

support was based upon three children. An Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce was
entered on July 8,1997 and the support remained the same pursuant to that order (R215-221).
The Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce referenced the Order from the Order to Show
Cause in setting the child support amount (R216 at f 2). The child support was being
collected through the Office of Recovery Services, and on June 1,1999 a request was made
to the Office of Recovery Services to modify the support to have it reduced based upon
emancipation of one of the three children (R807 atp.5). The Office of Recovery Services did
not change the support obligation administratively because there was no child support
worksheet in the court file which would indicate the income of the parties, how many
children, who was with whom; and other related items in order to make the adjustment
(R807 at p.4). The child support worksheet should have been filed by Ms. Horrocks with her
Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce, but she failed to do this relying on the reference
in the Order (R41) to set the support amount.
Because of financial problems that Mr. Blain was suffering at the time, Mr. Blain
continued to seek through administrative processes the modification of the support obligation
(R807 at p. 10). Mr. Blain was unsuccessful in getting the Office of Recovery Services to
modify the support, so Mr. Blain on April 6,2001 filed a Verified Petition for Modification
of Decree of Divorce (R594-605). Ms. Horrocks responded pursuant to an Answer which
simply denied the petition, and did not set forth any affirmative defenses (R623-624).
At the conclusion of Mr. Blain's case in chief, Ms. Horrocks thereafter took the stand
and commenced testifying to her claimed past credits and offsets, and an alleged agreement
5

to justify her position as to why the support obligation should not be modified. Mr. Blain
objected to this testimony because there was no notice that the claimed credits, offset and
alleged agreement were Ms. Horrocks' claimed position (Answer) which objection the court
overruled and allowed testimony on those subjects (R807 at p.27). Ms. Horrocks further
testified as to what the Amended Order on Stipulation (R434 at ^ 5) stated. Mr. Blain
objected to her testimony as an attempt to having her modify the order of the court by parole
evidence which the trial court overruled and allowed the testimony to be presented by Ms.
Horrocks (R807 at p.37 and 38).
As Ms. Horrocks continued to testify in regards to the alleged agreement, Mr. Blain
objected based on no foundation which objection the court took no action on, and allowed
the testimony of Ms. Horrocks as well as an explanation from her attorney wherein they
claimed that the alleged agreement to maintain the support at the amount for three children
was from Mr. Blain, and his attorney (R807 at p. 38).
On cross examination it was discovered that the person who had informed Ms.
Horrocks that the child support was to remain at the level for three children and not change
upon emancipation of a minor child supposedly came from her attorney, and not from Mr.
Blain nor his attorney. Her testimony was requested to be stricken as hearsay which the court
denied (R807 at p/71, 72 and 73).
Mr. Blain testified that there was no agreement ever made which would have
prevented the child support from being modified as each minor child reached the age of
eighteen and/or graduated from high school, and that it was his understanding that the child
6

support would change when the event(s) occurred (R807 at p.81 and 82). Ms. Horrocks
admitted that there is no Order which states that the child support obligation cannot be
modified (R807at p.72 and 74).
The pertinent language dealing with the provision in the Amended Order on
Stipulation on the support obligation states as follows:
5. Respondent is to pay as and for child support for the benefit of the
parties' minor children, base child support in the amount of $831.00 per
month. This obligation is deemed to begin effective January 1,1998, and shall
continue with respect to each minor child until that child shall reach the age of
18 or graduate from high school in the normal course of his or her education.
Respondent's income is subject to income withholding in accordance with
Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-11-401 through 414 (R435).
At the time the Amended Order on Stipulation was entered, March 20, 1998, the
parties had three minor children. The oldest child would have become emancipated when
the request was made by Mr. Blain to the Office of Recovery Services on June 1, 1999.
Ms. Horrocks' testimony was that the parties' had entered into the Amended Order
on Stipulation based upon monies owed to her by Mr. Blain, and that the language contained
in the Order at f 5 meant that Mr. Blain could not change at any time the child support
obligation. It was this testimony and this alleged agreement that Mr. Blain continued to
object to as it was presented, which objections were overruled as noted above.
Mr. Blain had requested that he be awarded the right to claim the parties' remaining
minor child for all tax purposes (R594-605 and 807 at p. 15). Ms. Horrocks, whose now
claimed income is supposedly less than minimum wage (R807 at p.76), wanted the tax
exemption so that her current husband can use the child on their joint tax filing. Under the
7

support order which the court left in effect, the amount of support paid by Mr. Blain to Ms.
Horrocks for one child is $831 per month.
The amounts that the child support would have been paid had the court modified the
support order based upon emancipation of a minor child would have been $680 per month
when there were two minor children remaining in the home, and $413 per month with one
minor child remaining in the home (R807 at p. 13, Exhibit 20; R807 at p. 15). The over
payment would have been $151 per month when there were two minor children, and $418
per month when there is only one minor child left (R807 at p. 16).
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS
The issues before the trial court were Mr. Blain's petition for modification of the
support amount, his request for having the minor child for tax purposes, and his attorney's
fees. Because the support had not been modified with the emancipation of each minor child
there was an overpayment which overpayment should have been refunded to Mr. Blain,
credited against future support obligations, or a judgement entered for the same. Ms.
Horrocks' Answer set forth no affirmative defenses and was just a general denial of the
petition. It was inappropriate for the trial court to allow, and thereafter accept testimony
relating to a claimed "deviated order" as made by Ms. Horrocks. The Amended Order on
Stipulation contains no evidence of a "deviated order" and the trial court, in allowing hearsay
testimony, and parol evidence misinterpreted ^f 5 of the Amended Order on Stipulation. Mr.
Blain's position is supported by case law and statutory law that the support obligation should
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have been modified on the emancipation of each child and the support obligation modified
consistent with those emancipations.
Ms. Horrocks' stated that her income was less than minimum wage. Mr. Blain's child
support, as it relates to the parties, is what is supporting the parties minor child. Ms.
Horrocks' income and support obligation is insufficient to pay for the minor child's on going
expenses. It would be improper to allow Ms. Horrocks' the minor child for tax purposes.
The fact that the minor child is used on a joint tax filing with Ms. Horrocks' current husband
is not relevant to the award of the minor child for tax purposes as it pertains to the parties.
ARGUMENT
POINT I
The trial court erred in allowing the testimony of Appellee
and thereafter failing to modify the child support obligation
of Appellant based on that testimony.

When the parties' oldest child had graduated from high school, (that child previously
having reached the age of eighteen), Mr. Blain, timely and appropriately, made a request to
the Office of Recovery Services, who was collecting the child support, to administratively
reduce the child support amount. This request was made during the same period of time that
there was a matter pending before this honorable court in the case of Johansen v. Johansen,
202 Ut. App. 75, 45 P3d 520 (Ut. Ct. App. 2002). Similarly to Johansen, the Office of
Recovery Services refused to modify the support obligation because it was a lump sum
amount without a worksheet. In this case it was Ms. Horrocks' responsibility to file the child
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support worksheet. This was never done. The amount of incomes attributable to each party
was contained in the court records however the Office of Recovery Services required the
worksheet to modify the order and without it they refused to modify the support obligation.
The failure on the part of the Ms. Horrocks to file the worksheet precluded the Office of
Recovery Services from modifying the child support amount on June 1, 1999 when the
support should have been changed. The support at that time should have been reduced to the
sum of $680 per month which would have been a $151 monthly difference from the initial
order.
Because the Office of Recovery Services did not administratively change the support
obligation, Mr. Blain was required to file his petition to modify the support obligation.
After the filing of the petition, there was a hearing on an Order to Show Cause as filed
by Mr. Blain at which time the trial court modified the child support amount to $431 per
month, however the Office of Recovery Services continued to withhold the $831 per month.
At trial on February 21,2003, the trial court set aside that temporary order and continued the
$831 per month rather than having the support obligation reduced to the sum of $413 per
month.
The testimony of Ms. Horrocks' began with an claim that the parties had entered into
the Amended Order on Stipulation as a result of agreements between herself and Mr. Blain
which precluded Mr. Blain from modifying the support obligation. Her position was that the
Amended Order on Stipulation was an agreement for all past and future claims. Her position
is in effect that the Amended Order on Stipulation is either an accord and satisfaction, res
10

judicata, or some type of estoppel, all of which are to preclude Mr. Blain from modifying the
support obligation. Her Answer gave no notice of any defense for avoidance of Mr. Blain5 s
request to have the child support modified. Mr. Blain had objected timely to this testimony
and informed the court that there was no notice as to a claim of avoidance, yet the court
allowed the testimony. Rule 8(c) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure requires that an
accord and satisfaction, estoppel, res judicata all be specifically pleaded in order to be
allowed to be used as a defense. Hintze v. Seaich, 20 Utah 2d 275, 437 P.2d 202 (1968).
Because no notice of avoidance was ever plead by Ms. Horrocks, Mr. Blain was at a
disadvantage is rebutting and refuting Ms. Horrocks' claims. This was literally allowing
"trial by ambush" which is not to occur and is the reason why a party is required to plead
affirmative defenses. The failure of Ms. Horrocks to plead any affirmative defense for the
avoidance of Mr. Blain's request preclude her from asserting them at trial. Creekview Apts.
Exrel. Redman Invs., Inc. v. State Farm Ins. Co., Ill P.2d693 (Ut. Ct. App. 1989); General
Ins. Co. Of Am. v. Carnicero Dynasty Corp., 545 P.2d 502 (Ut. 1976); Pratt v. Board of
Educ, 564 P.2d 294 (Ut. 1977); Manger v. Davis, 619 P.2d 687 (Ut. 1980). The trial court
used this testimony in making its Findings of Fact 2, 3, 4,5 and 7. However, in reviewing
the amounts that were claimed to be owing to Ms. Horrocks from Mr. Blain, all those
amounts were satisfied in whole when the Questar 401(k) was awarded to Ms. Horrocks
pursuant to the Amended Order on Stipulation. Her claims and evidence as to the same were
not appropriate nor relevant for the trial on the modification of the child support and should
not have been allowed to be presented at trial.
11

The trial court allowed extrinsic evidence based upon the trial court's belief that Tf 5
of the Amended Order on Stipulation was ambiguous. This is the trial court's Finding of
Fact % 1. Mr. Blain timely objected to this testimony stating that it was improper for the
court to use parole evidence to change the terms and meaning of ^f 5 of the Amended Order
on Stipulation. According to Ms. Horrocks, she testified that her "understanding" that the
support could not be changed came from her attorney. This "understanding" is clearly
hearsay testimony which was objected to timely. The trial court used this hearsay testimony
in making its Findings of Fact ^j 3 and 4. There was no testimony at trial from Ms. Horrocks'
prior attorneys, Harry Caston and Barbara L. Townsend, which support her claims.
Even if this court allows the testimony to stand, a plain reading of the language in
Tf 5 of the Amended Order on Stipulation does not support the court's conclusion. The
language in the paragraph identifies "base child support" for the support for the three minor
children that the parties had at the time the Order was entered. Base child support is defined
as "...the monthly obligation listed on the statutory base combined child support obligation
table, found after determining the monthly combined adjusted gross income and the number
of children..." Ball v. Peterson, 912 P.2d 1006, 1010 (Ut. Ct. App. 1996). The paragraph
further states that the support "...shall continue with respect to each minor child until that
child shall reach the age of 18 or graduate from high school..." (Emphasis added). The "until"
contemplates that support is to change upon a child reaching 18 or graduating from high
school In order for the Order to meet the court's conclusion, the Order would have to have
stated that the support continues at $831 without modification irrespective of a child reaching
12

the age of 18 or graduating from high school. Language that the Order is a "deviated Order"
that cannot be changed or modified is not contained in ^f 5 of the Order and Ms. Horrocks
admitted that there is no language in any order which would prohibit that child support from
being modified. This would be contrary to the trial court's Finding of Fact Tf 5. f 5 of the
Amended Order on Stipulation does not support the trial court's Finding of Fact f 5.
If this court allows Ms. Horrocks' testimony to stand, it is clear that Mr. Blain's
understanding of ^f 5 of the Amended Order on Stipulation was that the support is to change
as a child reaches 18 or graduates from high school, which is consistent with the language
of the paragraph. Ms. Horrocks' "understanding" is contrary to the language of the
paragraph. Even allowing Ms. Horrocks' testimony, there is no "meeting of the minds" in
regards to this issue. There is no evidence that Mr. Blain agreed to have the support continue
at a rate for three children as a child became emancipated. Mr. Blain's testimony was that
there was no such agreement. Even if is were true that Ms. Horrocks' attorney told her that
support would not change on emancipation of a child, there is no evidence that Mr. Blain
knew or agreed to this condition. Ms. Horrocks needs to show that Mr. Blain agreed to these
terms in order for there to be a contract between these parties. Reliance upon what her
attorney told her is insufficient to establish any agreement from Mr. Blain.
Mr. Blain had requested that the support modify as contemplated pursuant to Utah
Code Ann. §78-45-7.10. He took the necessary steps to request modification from the state
of Utah, Office of Recovery Services and thereafter from the court. Mr. Blain took the
course of action which this court determined to be appropriate in Johansen v. Johansen,
13

supra. As in Johansen, Mr. Blain should be allowed to have his child support obligation
reduced upon the emancipation of a minor child.
A substantial overpayment has been made by Mr. Blain and he is entitled to have
those monies returned to him. It was clear that the trial court did not want to have to make
Ms. Horrocks repay Mr. Blain. In Ball v. Peterson, supra, this court had ordered an
arrearage judgment on an emancipation issue. Mr. Blain should be allowed to have a
judgment for the overpayment in order for each party to be treated consistently before the
law. This would also be consistent with this court's ruling in Johansen v. Johansen, supra.
POINT II
Appellant should be allowed to claim the minor child for
all tax purposes.
Mr. Blain had requested that he be awarded the child for tax purposes both in his
petition and at trial. The trial court made no findings on this request and as such Ms.
Horrocks is allowed to claim the child by default. The trial court should have made findings
on this issue and its failure to do such is an abuse of discretion. Jefferies v. Jefferies, 752
P.2d909(Ut.Ct.App. 1988). Mr. Blain's monthly income was $3,721 (R807 at p. 14). Ms.
Horrocks' monthly income from her own testimony was less than minimum wage however
minimum wage would be imputed to her. Total child support would be $513 of which Mr.
Blain's share would be $413 and Ms. Horrocks' share would be $100 (R807 at p. 15 and
Exhibit No. 2 land 22).
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In reviewing each parties' contribution to the cost of raising the minor child, Mr.
Blain's payment substantially exceeds that of Mr. Horrocks. Ms. Horrocks wanted the minor
child for tax purposes based on her joint tax return with her husband as it helps her husband.
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.21 does not go to spouses but as to the parties. Mr. Blain meets
the primary factor as required by paragraph (2)(a) of the statute. He is current in his support
obligation. He has a need for the exemption whereas Ms. Horrocks does not need the
exemption. Ms. Horrocks' husband's need for the exemption is not relevant and should not
be part of the issue in determining who should be awarded the exemption. The trial court
should have awarded Mr. Blain the child for all tax purposes.
POINT III
Appellant should be awarded his attorney's fees,
Mr. Blain admits that the trial court has broad discretion in determining if attorney's
fees should be awarded and that this court is not to disturb that determination unless there is
an abuse of discretion. It is Mr. Blain's position that the trial court did not want to have to
make Ms. Horrocks repay the monies that Mr. Blain should have been awarded based on the
overpayment of child support. Because the trial court left the support at the $831 per month
figure, to make up for this, the trial court required each party to pay their own fees. Mr.
Blain should have prevailed on his case in chief based upon the statute and the supporting
case law. Had he prevailed, he should have been awarded his attorney's fees. An award of
attorney's fees to Mr. Blain is appropriate.
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CONCLUSION
Utah Code Ann. §78-45-7.10 allows for the child support to be modified upon a minor
child becoming emancipated. This modification is automatic pursuant to the statute. Mr.
Blain was entitled to have his support reduced as each successive child became emancipated.
Mr. Blain is entitled to have the overpayments returned to him.
Mr. Blain should be awarded the minor child for all tax purposes. Mr. Blain is the
person who primarily pays the cost of raising the minor child, not Ms. Horrocks. Mr. Blain
meets the statutory requirements to be awarded the tax exemption relating to the last minor
child.
Further, Mr. Blain should be awarded his attorney's fees. Mr. Blain should have been
awarded his requested relief at trial. An award of attorney's fees to Mr. Blain is appropriate
in these circumstances.
DATED this fn

day of May, 2004.

Attornev for Resnondent and AnDellant
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Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law.

Exhibit C

Order from trial held February 21, 2003.
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EXHIBIT A

^lEDDOTfCT COURT

Harry Caston (4009)
Barbara L. Townsend (5568)
McKAY, BURTON & THURMAN
Attorneys for Plaintiff
600 Gateway Tower East
10 East South Temple Street
Salt Lake City, UT 84133
Telephone: (801) 521-4135

Third Judicial District

MAR 2 0 1998
By

'

M^vh^^
fioputy Clerk

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

JULIE D. BLAIN,
Petitioner,
vs.

:

AMENDED ORDER ON STIPULATION

:

-4r Jf^i^oS^
Civil No. 954904404 DA

:
Judge William B. Bohling

DENNIS D. BLAIN,
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey
Respondent.

:

Based upon the Stipulation of the parties and other good cause appearing therefore, the
Court Orders as follows:
1.

Petitioner is hereby awarded all Respondent's right, title and interest in

Respondent's Questar 401k program. Questar Corporation is to release such funds or the rights
thereto to Petitioner, Julie Blain at her option and upon such terms as are consistent with said
program. Upon the occurrence thereof Petitioner's lien thereon is to be deemed merged with her

ownership interest therein. Petitioner shall be responsible for any tax consequences arising out
of early withdrawal or transfer.
2.

Respondent is to withdraw all pending motions, including the Respondent's pending

motion to set aside the amended supplemental divorce decree.
3.

Respondent is not to file any further motions to set aside any judgment currently

rendered in this case and shall not file any motion to set aside any judgment or order that issues
from the Stipulation on which this Order is based.
4.

Petitioner will upon transfer of Respondantfs 401k program to her, execute such

satisfactions of judgment as may be necessary to relieve Respondent from any further liability
arising out of arrearages as set forth in the Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce in this case,
as further set forth herein, or any judgment or order previously entered in this case.
5.

Respondent is to pay as and for child support for the benefit of the parties' minor

children, base child support in the amount of $831.00 per month. This obligation is deemed to
begin effective January 1, 1998, and shall continue with respect to each minor child until that
child shall reach the age of 18 or graduate from high school in the normal course of his or her
education. Respondent's income is subject to income withholding in accordance with Utah Code
Ann. §§ 62A-11-401 through 414.
6.

The parties are to maintain medical and health insurance on the parties' minor

children, provided such insurance is reasonably available through employment or otherwise. The
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party that may obtain the most economical insurance package should maintain such insurance,
with the costs thereof divided by the parties as set forth in this Order.
7.

Each party is to pay one-half of the medical insurance premiums incurred on behalf

of the parties1 minor children effective January 1, 1998, which amounts may be added or deducted
from Respondents monthly base child support obligation. Respondent's income is subject to
income withholding in accordance with Utah Code Ann. §§ 62A-11-401 through 414.
8.

The party maintaining medical insurance for the benefit of the parties1 minor

children shall provide verification of such insurance to the other party, or to the Office of
Recovery Services under Title IV of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. Section 601, etseq., and
shall notify the other party or the Office of Recovery Services of any change of insurance carrier,
premium or benefits within 30 days of learning of such change.
9.

Each party is to pay one-half of the non-covered medical and dental expenses

incurred on behalf of the parties minor children. The party incurring such expense shall provide
written verification of the cost and payment to the other party within 30 days of payment, one-half
of which shall be reimbursed within 30 days of receipt of said verification.
10.

Respondent is hereby relieved of his obligation for any arrearages as previously

set forth in the Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce, which by that Decree were set at
$5,000.00 and were to be paid at the rate of $110.00 per month. Said amounts, to the extent
uncollected, are deemed satisfied at the time of the transfer of the 401k program. Petitioner will
upon transfer of the 401k program to her execute satisfaction(s) of judgment and file such
3

satisfaction(s) of judgment with office of Recovery Services, or such other office or agency as
may be appropriate to stop any further collection action on such arrearages.
11.

Respondent is hereby relieved of his obligation to cover or pay any portion of the

second mortgage as previously set forth in the Amended Supplemental Decree of Divorce in the
approximate amount of $35,000.00, and which were to be paid by Respondent at the rate of
$390.00 per month. Said amounts to extent uncollected, are deemed satisfied at the time of the
transfer of the 401k program. Petitioner will upon transfer of the 401k program to her execute
satisfaction(s) of judgment and file such satisfaction(s) of judgment with office of Recovery
Services, or such other office or agency as may be appropriate to stop any further collection
action on such arrearages.
12.

In the event legal action is necessary to enforce the terms and conditions of this

Order, the costs and reasonable attorneys' fees incurred shall be born by the nonprevailing party.
13.

Each party is to execute such documents as may be necessary to effect the terms

of this Order.
14.

This Order is intended to modify only those provisions of the Amended

Supplemental Decree of Divorce set forth herein. Any provisions of the Amended Supplemental

4

Decree of Divorce that are not modified by this Order are to continue in full force and effect until
so ordered or modified by the Court.
DATED this *2£) day of

1998.
THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT

Judge William B. Bonling
Third District Court Judge
Approved as to form and content:

RICHARD GOLDEN
Attorney for Respondent
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EXHIBIT B

F"
T

f>"G Judicial District

MAR 1 3 2003

RICHARD S. NEMELKA #2396
DENNIS L. MANGRUM #3687
NEMELKA & MANGRUM, P.C.
7110 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801) 943-8107
Fax: (801) 943-4744

SALTLAKi

NTY

^putyciSTT

Attorneys for Petitioner

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JULIE D. BLAIN (HORROCKS),

j

FINDINGS OF FACT AND
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW

Plaintiff,
vs.
DENNIS D. BLAIN,
Defendant.
|

Civil No. 954904404 DA
Judge William B. Bohling
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey

The trial on Respondent's Petition to Modify came on regularly for hearing before the
Honorable William B. Bohling of the above-entitled Court on the 21st day of February, 2003,
Petitioner being present and being represented by her attorney Richard S. Nemelka and
Respondent being present and being represented by his attorney Randy Ludlow and both parties
having been sworn and having testified and evidence having been offered to the Court and
Exhibits having been admitted and arguments having been made to the Court and the Court
having reviewed the same and good cause appearing therefor, the Court herebyfindsas follows:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

That paragraph 5 of the Amended Order on Stipulation dated the March 20, 1998

is ambiguous and it was necessary for the Court to receive extrinsic evidence in regard to the
intent of the parties relating to the payment of $831 per month as child support.
2.

At the time the Stipulation of the parties was entered into on February 2,1998

from which the Amended Order on Stipulation was drafted, the Defendant was indebted to the
Plaintiff for child support and alimony arrears in the sum of $4,670 under the Supplemental
Decree of Divorce and an additional $2,078 in child support pursuant to other orders of the
Court. Further, the Petitioner had obtained an Order on Order to Show Cause dated the 14th of
November, 1997 wherein Petitioner was awarded the $35,000 of Respondent's 401K for
Respondent's failure to comply with the Orders of the Court in regard to paying the second
mortgage of $390 per month with the issue of taxes and penalties on the 401K to be reserved until
the money was withdrawn. Petitioner also had additional judgments in the Order on Order to
Show Cause dated the 14th of November, 1997 for the sum of $420.47 for medical expenses, for
over payment of insurance premiums in the sum of $111.30 and $750 for attorney's fees.
3.

The Petitioner testified that it was her understanding that the intent of the

language of paragraph 5 of the Amended Order on Stipulation was to have the monthly child
support amount of $831 per month continue on a monthly basis until the youngest child of the
parties turned 18 or her normal class graduated from high school, whichever occurs last. She was
willing to agree to the same and to waive her claims for the aforementioned arrearages and
judgments in consideration for receiving the $831 each month. Petitioner also understood that the
2

monthly amount of $831 per month would not be decreased when two of the children turned 18
or their normal class graduated from high school and would only terminate when the youngest
child had turned 18 or her normal class graduated from high school.
4.

The Court further finds that at the time the Stipulation was entered into by and

between the parties in February of 1998 that the Respondent had not paid to the Petitioner the
monthly payment of $390 on the second mortgage, as was ordered in the Supplemental Decree of
Divorce. The Courtfinds,based upon the foregoing, that the Petitioner's understanding in
regard to the intent of the language contained in paragraph 5 of the Amended Order on
Stipulation dated March 20, 1998 is correct and that she is entitled to receive the sum of $831 per
month until the youngest child of the parties reaches 18 or her normal class graduatesfromhigh
school.
5.

The Court further finds that the Amended Order on Stipulation dated March 20,

1998 is a deviationfromthe base combined child support obligation table contained in Utah Code
§78-45-7.14 and that the automatic adjustment statute contained in Utah Codes §78-45-7.10 is
not applicable to the facts of this case.
6.

Both parties have incurred attorneys fees and neither party's claims or position are

asserted in bad faith and, therefore, it is reasonable that both parties assume and pay their own
attorneys fees and costs incurred herein.
7.

The Respondent did not over pay his child support obligations and, therefore, is

not entitled to any reimbursement in regard to any over payment.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and enters its
3

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Respondent's Verified Petition for Modification of the Decree of Divorce is hereby

2.

That the Amended Order on Stipulation dated March 20, 1998 in regard to the

denied.

child support obligation is a deviationfromUtah Code §78-45-7.14 and based thereon the
automatic adjustment statute contained in Utah Code §78-45-7.10 is not applicable to said order
and the Respondent's obligation to pay child support.
3.

The Respondent shall continue to pay child support to the Petitioner in the

amount of $831.00 per month until the youngest child reaches 18 or normal class graduates from
high school, whichever occurs last.
4.

That each party shall pay their own attorneys fees and costs incurred herein.

DATED this

A 3

day of February, 2003.
BY THE COURT:

W^L^^A

Honorable William Bohling,
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Randy Ludlow, Attorney for Respondent
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
This is to certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of Fact
and Conclusions of Law this

2^y day of February, 2003, postage prepaid and addressed as

follows:
Randy S. Ludlow
320 South 300 East, Suite 200
Salt Lake City, UT 84111
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EXHIBIT C

G#>
\

#

FILED 5SSTTO7 COURT
Third Judicial District

MAR 1 3 2003

RICHARD S. NEMELKA #2396
DENNIS L. MANGRUM #3687
NEMELKA & MANGRUM, P.C.
7110 South Highland Drive
Salt Lake City, Utah 84121
Telephone: (801) 943-8107
Fax: (801) 943-4744

By.

.SALTUrfObliNTY
Deputy Clerk

Attorneys for Petitioner

IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH

JULIE D. BLAIN (HORROCKS),

ORDER FROM TRIAL HELD
FEBRUARY 21,2003

PlainthT,
vs.
DENNIS D. BLAIN,
Defendant.

Civil No. 954904404 DA
Judge William B. Bohling
Commissioner T. Patrick Casey

The trial on Respondent's Petition to Modify came on regularly for hearing before the
Honorable William B. Bohling of the above-entitled Court on the 21st day of February, 2003,
Petitioner being present and being represented by her attorney Richard S. Nemelka and
Respondent being present and being represented by his attorney Randy Ludlow and both parties
having been sworn and having testified and evidence having been offered to the Court and

in ~ll

Exhibits having been admitted and arguments having been made to the Court and the Court
having reviewed the same and good cause appearing therefor, the Court herebyfindsas follows:
1.

Respondent's Verified Petition for a Modification of the Decree of Divorce be and

the same is hereby denied.
2.

That the Amended Order on Stipulation dated March 20,1998 in regard to the

child support obligation is a deviationfromUtah Code §78-45-7.14 and based thereon the
automatic adjustment statute contained in Utah Code §78-45-7.10 is not applicable to said order
and the Respondent's obligation to pay child support.
3.

The Respondent shall continue to pay child support to the Petitioner in the

amount of $831.00 per month until the youngest child reaches 18 or normal class graduates from
high school, whichever occurs last.
4.

That each party shall payy their
tneir own
own;attorneys fees and costs incurred herein.

DATED this

JO

day of^ebnwfy, 2003.

Honorable William B. Bohling,,
APPROVED AS TO FORM:

Randy Ludlow, Attorney for Respondent
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